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NOTES
But when a fledgling party tries in good faith to comply with an unclear
statutory procedure, and a reasonable analogy supports inclusion of the party
on the ballot, a compelling argument is made for a liberal reading of the
statute to allow inclusion. The purpose of the statute could not be to require
a slavish conformity to standards that are not even made clear. As noted
above," the purpose of election regulations is to prevent fraud and corrupt
practices in the election processes. It is difficult to understand how this
purpose would be thwarted if La Raza Unida were allowed to have its party
designation on the ballot.
It is not improper to consider the effect of such a decision on other mi-
nority groups. Other courts have considered this in their decisions." Minorities
are already suspicious of "establishment" forms and procedures. Here a group
has attempted to work within the system and has been struck down on a
technicality. Their next attempt might be outside the system. Groups such as
this petitioner should be encouraged, not discouraged, to do as they have done.'
Paul T. Mann
The Uniform Commercial Code and the Texas
Certificate of Title Act Are In Pari Materia
Defendants, automobile dealers, purchased four automobiles from Parker
Chevrolet Plaintiff, Associates Discount, who held a perfected security interest
and the manufacturer's certificate on each automobile, caused the automobiles
to be seized and sold under writ of sequestration. The defendants counter-
claimed, alleging that the plaintiff was guilty of malicious conversion. Plaintiff
appealed appellate court judgments in favor of defendants' counterclaims, and
upholding their motions for summary judgment.! Held, affirmed in part and
'See text accompanying note 14 supra.
'Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Bacon v. Holzman, 264 F. Supp. 120
(E.D. Ill. 1967).
'The court in Bacon v. Holzman, 264 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Ill. 1967), had before it
another instance in which a minority party's nominating petition was denied on technical
grounds. The court's language indicates an approach which to this writer is highly preferable
to the approach taken by the Texas court. The opinion reads, id. at 133-34:
Seemingly it is the unstated . . . policy to compel petitioners generally to
strictly comply with every statutory requirement. As a result and in apparent
good faith, technical grounds are often utilized to disqualify nominating
petitions. For the most part such action is statutorily on impeccable ground.
... [T]he provisions . . . should be interpreted liberally .... Most certainly,
those provisions should not be construed in a fashion which discourages candi-
dates or causes them to become cynical of the process. . . . It is highly
desirable in our judgment, that the Board make a conscious effort to refrain
from disqualifying signatures for mere technical reasons. . . . Such an ap-
proach is destructive of the democratic process in the long run. We believe
that every citizen should be encouraged to run for office, or to enter public
service.
' Parker Chevrolet was a co-defendant who did not appeal.
'Rattan Chevrolet, Inc. v. Associates Discount Corp., 443 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1969), error granted; Banner Chevrolet, Inc. v. Associates Discount Corp., 443
S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969), error granted.
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remanded in part: An automobile dealer who purchases in the ordinary course
of business from the inventory of another dealer is entitled to the rights of a
buyer in the ordinary course of business under the Texas Business and Com-
merce Code and those rights are not nullified by the Texas Certificate of Title
Act; therefore, the case is remanded to determine if the defendants are in fact
buyers in the ordinary course of business, and the extent of their damages.
Associates Discount Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet, Inc.; Associates Discount Corp.
v. Banner Chevrolet, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1970).
I. THE TEXAS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ACT AND THE COMMON LAW
Under the common law an owner who entrusted goods with a dealer in
goods of the same type assumed the risk that the dealer would not sell them to
a bona fide purchaser! A bona fide purchaser without knowledge of the cir-
cumstances would get good title.4 This rule is codified in section 2.403 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.'
This long-acknowledged rule was overturned in Texas in Motor Investment
Co. v. City of Hamlin.' That case involved a foreclosure action by a finance
company on a fire truck purchased by the city. The lien attached as security
for a loan to the truck dealer for the purchase of the vehicle, and this was
noted on the manufacturer's certificate and filed with the county clerk. The
purchaser never saw the certificate, nor did it ever receive a certificate of title.
The truck was hauled from Dallas to Hamlin on a convoy where it was dem-
onstrated and sold. The court stated that this sale was not in the regular
course of business and that the city was not a purchaser out of inventory. The
court then held that section 45 of the Certificate of Title Act gave the
mortgagee a superior claim to the good faith purchaser.! That section states
that "[eixposure for sale of any motor vehicle by the owner thereof with the
knowledge and consent of any mortgagee shall not affect the rights of any
mortgagee as against all third parties."' Despite the fact that an "owner" does
not ordinarily include a dealer,9 the court held that "owner," as used in section
45, was not so restricted, but included all owners." The rule of this case is
rather harsh and would appear to impose a burden on the alienation of motor
vehicles."
The purpose of the Certificate of Title Act is to prevent theft, traffic in
stolen automobiles, and the sale of encumbered motor vehicles without dis-
closure to the purchaser of any and all liens." The procedure for new auto-
mobiles is not to issue the certificate of title until the automobile is sold to
'R. BROWN, LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 71 (1936).
4ld.
5TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. 5 2.403 (1968).
"142 Tex. 486, 179 S.W.2d 278 (1944).
"TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1436-1, § 45 (1953).
Sld.
9 id. § 4.
10 142 Tex. at 492, 179 S.W.2d at 281.
"See, e.g., 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTEREST IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 26.9 (1965),
where the author suggests that an ordinary good faith purchaser out of inventory should
always take free of a certificate of title act.
1"TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1436-1, § 1 (1953).
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an ordinary customer. 3 While the car is being transferred from manufacturer
to dealer to another dealer, etc., the manufacturer's certificate, which is held
by either the dealer or his financier, suffices as the certificate of title. 4 Any
security interest in the automobile must be shown on the manufacturer's
certificate." While the strict interpretation given the Act by the court in
Motor Investment certainly achieved the purpose of the Act, it was an abrupt,
and perhaps unwarranted, change from the common law.
In two other jurisdictions the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
has limited the effect of existing Certificate of Title Acts. " The Code allows
a buyer in the ordinary course of business to take title free of a perfected
security interest even though he has knowledge of that interest." In Pennsyl-
vania, for example, the courts have held that the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle
Code 8 must be read in conjunction with the Uniform Commercial Code and
cannot defeat the rights of a purchaser out of inventory."3 The Code does
not expressly repeal the Certificate of Title Act, but it does repeal all acts
and parts of acts that conflict with it."0 Furthermore, since the Code was
adopted after the Act, the Code, being the later in time, would prevail."'
II. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AS APPLIED
TO THE SALE OF AUTOMOBILES
The sponsor's official text of the Uniform Commercial Code, which Texas
has followed, requires that a purchase-money security interest in motor vehicles
be filed. Most purchase-money security interests do not have to be filed,
but the writers specifically included motor vehicles as an exception.' Some
states have refused to grant special treatment to motor vehicles by either not
specifically including them as an exception," or by stating that where the
Code and Certificate of Title Act conflict, the Title Act will prevail.' It is
possible for both to exist without conflict as long as secured parties are not
'31Id. 7, 28.
4 1d. § 22, 28.
15 1d. § 41.loSee, e.g., Medico Leasing Co. v. Smith, 457 P.2d 548 (Okla. 1969); Sterling Ac-
ceptance Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600 (1961).17 TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.307(a) (1968). See also id. § 1.201(9), which
states:
Buyer in the ordinary course of business means a person who in good faith
and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership
rights or security interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course
from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind but does not in-
clude a pawnbroker. 'Buying' may be for cash or by exchange of other prop-
erty or on secured or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or docu-
ments of title under a pre-existing contract for sale but does not include a
transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money
debt.
Note that knowledge of the existence of a security interest differs from knowledge that the
sale violates a security interest. See O.M. Scott Credit Corp. v. Apex, Inc., 97 R.I. 442, 198
A.2d 673 (1964).
'
8 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, S 201 (1960).
'"Sterling Acceptance Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600 (1961).2 0 TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. 5 10.102 (1968).
21 Cain v. State, 20 Tex. 355 (1857).22 TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.302(d) (1968).
2 Id.24 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 9-302(1) (d) (1963).25 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-9-203(2) (Cum. Supp. 1969).
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given priority over buyers in the ordinary course of business.' Texas has
shown an intent that motor vehicles held in inventory be included in the
Code by specifically including a statement to that effect in a section exempting
other security interests which are centrally filed under some other statute."7
Nothing in the Code specifically shows an intent to repeal the Certificate of
Title Act, however.
Both Pennsylvania and Oklahoma courts have applied the terms of the
Code to motor vehicle sales. 8 In an Oklahoma case29 the true owner of the
automobile entrusted it with a dealer who sold it to another dealer. The
court held that the purchasing dealer was a buyer in the ordinary course of
business, and that it was immaterial that the true owner still held the cer-
tificate of title.8" That case is certainly more in line with the common law
than the Texas rule as stated in Motor Investment.
Several pre-Code cases had held that an automobile dealer was a bona fide
purchaser and could take title free of any security interest of which he had no
knowledge."1 Code section 9.307(a) permits a buyer in the ordinary course
of busiiess to take free of a security interest "even though the security inter-
est is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence." 2 Since
the bona fide purchaser without knowledge seems to be the forerunner of
the buyer in the ordinary course of business, the holdings under the Code
are not really unique, nor should they be unexpected. However, these cases
and the Code are in conflict with the Texas supreme court's interpretation of
the Texas Certificate of Title Act in Motor Investment.
III. ASSOCIATES DISCOUNT CORP. v. RATTAN, CHEVROLET, INC.;
ASSOCIATES DISCOUNT CORP. v. BANNER CHEVROLET, INC.
The Supreme Court of Texas had not dealt with the clash between the
Code and the Act until the present cases. Associates Discount Corp. v. Rattan
2" See, e.g., Macey, Motor Vehicle Title Certificates vs The UCC: The Two Faces of Auto-
mobile Dealer Financing, 74 COM. L.J. 5 (1969), where the author states that most of the
confusion arises over the question of whether the security interest must be filed under both
the Act and the Code. In the author's opinion the Code should apply to motor vehicle sales.
For further proof that the controversy exists, see C. BUNN, H. SNEED, R. SPEIDEL, & K.
REDDEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4.14(B) (1964),
where the authors state: "If you've wondered why we haven't as yet selected automobiles for
an illustration you'll now discover why. They're so 'different.' 'Different' in that our neat
law of security is upset by an overlay of motor vehicle registration and titling statutes .2 7
TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. S 9.302(d) (1968).
28 Medico Leasing Co. v. Smith, 457 P.2d 548 (Okla. 1969); Associates Discount Corp. v.
Old Freeport Bank, 421 Pa. 609, 220 A.2d 621 (1966); Taylor Motor Rental, Inc. v.
Associates Discount Corp., 196 Pa. Super. 182, 173 A.2d 688 (1961); Sterling Acceptance
Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600 (1961); Weisel v. McBride, 191 Pa.
Super. 411, 156 A.2d 613 (1959). See also Howarth v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 203
F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Pa. 1962), where a federal court, using Pennsylvania law, applied the
Code to a motor vehicle transaction.
2Medico Leasing Co. v. Smith, 457 P.2d 548 (Okla. 1969).
8 id. at 551.
" Colonial Fin. Co. v. DeBenigno, 125 Conn. 626, 7 A.2d 841 (1939); C. Jon Dev.
Corp. v. Pand-Rorsche Corp., 69 Il. App. 2d 469, 217 N.E.2d 416 (1966); General Fin.
Corp. v. Krause Motor Sales, 302 Ill. App. 210, 23 N.E.2d 781 (1939); P & E Fin. Co. v.
Stonecipher, 386 P.2d 765 (Okla. 1963); Stemmons v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 301
P.2d 212 (Okla. 1956).
8 2TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.307(a) (1968).
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NOTES
Chevrolet, Inc. and Associates Discount Corp. v. Banner Chevrolet, Inc.3
were consolidated by the supreme court because they involved substantially
the same facts. The issue in both was whether "[plurchase by an automobile
dealer from another dealer of a new, unregistered motor vehicle which is
subject to a security interest created by the seller is governed by provisions
of Uniform Commercial Code that protect a buyer in ordinary course of
business."34 In order to resolve this question the court first decided that section
45 of the Texas Certificate of Title Act' did not negate the applicable pro-
vision of the Code.'
As previously stated, the Certificate of Title Act has been interpreted
to give the holder of a security interest in motor vehicles a right to repossess
the vehicle from a good faith purchaser." This provision is, thus, in direct
conflict with Code section 9.307(a). The court found that since the statutes
deal with the same subject, they are in pari materia3 This, in effect, repeals
the Act as far as it applies to transaction's with a buyer in the ordinary course
of business, but it is still effective in all other types of transactions. Since the
Code does expressly repeal certain other acts by name, and without legislative
guidelines to the contrary, this is the most logical conclusion the court could
make.
Once the court decided that the Certificate of Title Act did not nullify
the applicable Code provision, it had no trouble in determining that the
Code applies to transactions between automobile dealers, and that a dealer
was entitled to the status of a buyer in the ordinary course of business. The
Pennsylvania cases cited earlier leave no doubt on this.3" The court stated that
since the definition of "goods" in section 2.105 was broad enough to include
automobiles, it was clear that the Code applied to automobile sales.4 This
seems somewhat cavalier in view of the controversy elsewhere that filing re-
quirements under a title act preclude application of the Code to motor vehicle
sales.4' This decision would have been better justified by the specific inclusions
of motor vehicle sales in article 9 of the Code. The court's difficulty probably
arises from the fact that it attempted to justify the decision both by section
2.403' and section 9.307 (a) .' Since the claimant here was a secured party,
the court should have relied solely on article 9, as it is specifically designed
for transactions in secured goods. Still, this neither explains, nor justifies,
the court's failure to discuss the possibility that the sale of motor vehicles
may be exempt from the Code.
The court remanded the case to determine whether the defendants were
in fact buyers in the ordinary course of business. Since their uncontradicted
'462 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1970).34 Id. at 546.
"TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 1436-1, § 45 (1953).
"
0 TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.307(a) (1968).
"
7 Motor Inv. Co. v. City of Hamlin, 142 Tex. 486, 179 S.W.2d 278 (1944).
3, 462 S.W.2d at 549.
" Even though the decisions of that jurisdiction have little precedential value in Texas, in
view of the fact that the Code is a uniform law and that this is a case of first impression in
Texas, the court was justified in looking to another jurisdiction for the answer.
40462 S.W.2d at 549.
4' See Macey, supra note 26.
42 The codification of the common-law rule of entrusted goods.
4 This section places a buyer in the ordinary course of business in a preferred position.
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affidavits stated that they were, this appears to be superfluous. The fact that
this was originally a summary judgment may have influenced the disposition.
Also, the court declined to say what effect the failure to transfer the manu-
facturer's certificate would have. However, since knowledge is not a factor,
the notice that would be furnished by the certificates is immaterial. The only
fact that seems to be missing is the measure of damages.
IV. CONCLUSION
This decision realigns Texas with the long-acknowledged common-law
principle favoring a bona fide purchaser where goods are entrusted to a
dealer in the same kind of goods. That principle is expressed in section
2.403 of the Code with respect to the sale of ordinary goods. Section 9.307 (a)
applies this rule to sales of secured goods. An interpretation of the Texas
Certificate of Title Act giving the secured party the right to take the motor
vehicle from the bona fide purchaser is contrary to this well-established
precedent.
The real issue of the case is whether the secured party or the buyer in
the ordinary course of business is going to be forced to take action against
the seller. The Code specifically gives the secured party the right to any
proceeds from the sale of the secured goods." The plaintiff included the term
"proceeds" in his financing statement; therefore, this right will last for the
duration of the financing statement.' Since a financier is normally in a better
position to determine the seller's solvency and credibility, it seems that he
should bear the brunt of having to seek retribution from the seller. As noted
by one of the Code commentators,* the lender knows that the borrower in-
tends to sell the items, and trading would be discouraged if a buyer knew
that his right was subject to a prior inventory lien. As a practical matter, the
dealer in these situations is usually judgment proof, but that should not in-
fluence a determination between the lender and the purchaser. Another
commentator has stated that all priorities involving security interests should
be governed by the Code no matter what the local title act may say."' The
Texas legislature has proposed that the provisions of the Certificate of Title
Act in conflict with the Code be repealed." In view of this decision such
action no longer is necessary--except, perhaps, for emphasis.
This holding quite properly leaves the plaintiff solely to his judgment
against the dealer, in the absence of a showing of bad faith or an unusual
course of business. It is important to note that this decision will not affect
transactions in stolen property. Nor does the Code advance traffic in stolen
goods. This decision merely settles the priority between a secured party and a
buyer in the ordinary course of business. The Certificate of Title Act will
still control traffic in stolen vehicles-its most important function.
E. Russell Nunnally, Jr.
4TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.306 (1968).
45 Id.
"12 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
708-11 (1964).
472 G. GILMORE, supra note 11, § 26.9.
4"Ruud, Amendment of the Texas Certificate of Title Act To Conform It to the Uniform
Commercial Code, 33 TEX. B.J. 968 (1970).
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